Learning, Analyzing and Protecting Android with TOMOYO Linux

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1. INTRODUCTIONS

TOMOYO overview

- MAC implementation for Linux
  - Behavior oriented system analyzer and protector
  - Pathname-based MAC tools
- It consists of:
  - a kernel patch (*ccspatch*)
  - a set of utilities (*ccstools*) for managing access control settings (a.k.a. policy)

MAC(Mandatory Access Control)

- Restrict access according to policy.
- No exception, no bypass
  - Performed inside kernel space
- SELinux, Smack, TOMOYO, AppArmor, LIDS, grsecurity, etc.

How to use TOMOYO?

- **Protect**
  - **System administrator's operations**
- **Learning**
  - **Know system behaviors**
- **Analyze**
  - **Debug**

Android overview



Android Kernel

- Linux Kernel 2.6 with some changes
  - Reduced set of standard Linux utilities -> toolbox
  - No support glibc -> Bionic libraries
  - No standard IPC -> Binder , specific IPC driver
  - No native windowing system
  - Optimized Power Management
  - Low memory killer, Alarm etc.

Dalvik and Zygote

- Runtime is made by **Java programs running in *Dalvik***: Virtual Machine for mobile devices
  - slow CPU, small RAM, no swap space, battery
  - Not a JVM, no JIT: only interpreter of DEX (optimized bytecode obtained from Java .class)
  - Multiple VM instances can run efficiently.
- ***Zygote* process**:
  - first instance of Dalvik VM, partially initialized
  - load *preload* classes and resources
  - is kept always alive in idle state

  When an *application execution* request occurs:
  - zygote fork()s to a new process…
    - …which loads the requested package

    (Biology concept of "zygote": duplicate, specialize and differentiate)

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

Android boot sequence



Android security model (1/2)

- Each application runs in its own process
  - Runtime in **separate instances** of Dalvik virtual machine



Android security model (2/2)

- Each process is a "secure sandbox"
  - Linux **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)** for file access: **all applications are assigned a unique UID** (constant)
    - UID for system services are hard-coded
    - UID for user packages are progressively assigned at install-time, **starting from uid 10000 (and mapped to app_0, app_1, …)**; they are saved in a file and are maintained constant during the life of the package on the device.
    - Application specific files are saved in **/data/data** in separate folders owned by specific UID users

2. TOMOYO ON ANDROID

TOMOYO Linux versions

- There are 2 development lines:
  - **Fully equipped version (1.x series)**
    - provides full functionalities of pathname-based MAC (MAC for files, network, capabilities…)
  - **Mainlined version (2.x series)**
    - uses Linux Security Modules (LSM)
    - subset of MAC functionalities (only for files, so far)
      - missing functionalities will be added in the future
    - supports only kernels 2.6.30 and later

Android kernel

- Android SDK 1.6 ("donut") comes with kernel 2.6.29 .

Android kernel

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Android kernel

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- TOMOYO 2.x is available since kernel 2.6.30
- TOMOYO 2.2 function is only file access control
- ***So, choose TOMOYO 1.x !!***

Porting TOMOYO to Android

- Patching Android Kernel with TOMOYO patch
- Adapting ccstools
- Cross-compiling for Android
- Adding TOMOYO Policy Loader to Android boot
- Creating policy

Patching Android Kernel

- TOMOYO 1.7.x (Fully equipped version)
- Emulator (no real Android device needed)
  → Linux kernel version: **Goldfish v2.6.29**
  - "Goldfish" is the name given to the ARM architecture emulated by Android SDK Emulator
- **ccspatch 1.7.1-pre** for **Goldfish v2.6.29**

Adapting ccstools

- **Ccstools is for managing TOMOYO's policy.**
- Ccstools was intended for use on PC
- Ccstools has been enhanced with **Network mode** for embedded systems
- More convenient for developing policies and debugging
- Two utilities are needed for the device: ccs-init, ccs-editpolicy-agent

Modifying Android boot (1/2)

- Put "ccs-init (program for activating TOMOYO)" inside /sbin/
  - the kernel will call /sbin/ccs-init before /init starts.
- Copy below files needed by /sbin/ccs-init
  - /system/bin/linker
    - /system/ partition is not mounted yet when /sbin/ccs-init starts.
  - /lib/libc.so
  - /lib/libm.so
    - Environment variable LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/system/lib" is not set yet when /sbin/ccs-init starts.

Modifying Android boot (2/2)

- Put "ccs-editpolicy-agent (program for managing TOMOYO remotely)" inside /sbin/
- Append

```
service ccs_agent /sbin/ccs-editpolicy-agent 0.0.0.0:7000
        oneshot
```

to /init.rc

- ccs-editpolicy-agent will listen to tcp port 7000
- We can issue "adb forward tcp:10000 tcp:7000" to connect from host environment.

Creating policy

- Put access control settings (a.k.a. policy) in /etc/ccs
  - /sbin/ccs-init will load them

Details:
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/android-arm.html

TOMOYO on Android overview



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

EDITING POLICY (VIA AGENT)

Environment



Editpolicy



Domain transition tree



Profile

File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

```
<<< Profile Editor >>>      13 entries    '?' for help


  0: PROFILE_VERSION=20090903
  1: PREFERENCE::audit={ max_grant_log=1024 max_reject_log=1024 task_info=yes path_info=yes }
  2: PREFERENCE::learning={ verbose=no max_entry=2048 exec.realpath=yes exec.argv0=yes symlink.target=yes }
  3: PREFERENCE::permissive={ verbose=yes }
  4: PREFERENCE::enforcing={ verbose=yes penalty=0 }
  5:   0-COMMENT=-----Disabled Mode-----
  6:   0-CONFIG={ mode=disabled grant_log=yes reject_log=yes }
  7:   1-COMMENT=-----Learning Mode-----
  8:   1-CONFIG={ mode=learning grant_log=yes reject_log=yes }
  9:   2-COMMENT=-----Permissive Mode-----
 10:   2-CONFIG={ mode=permissive grant_log=yes reject_log=yes }
 11:   3-COMMENT=-----Enforcing Mode-----
 12:   3-CONFIG={ mode=enforcing grant_log=yes reject_log=yes }
```

Profile 0 for disabled, 1 for learning,
2 for permissive, 3 for enforcing

Process tree



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

Problem with splitting domains

- The applications are executed with different UID (i.e.: root, system, app_#, ...) and different process name, but...

```
root      54    42     792   252   c0216634 afe0c2bc S /system/bin/qemu-props
system    65    36  175156 26124 ffffffff afe0c55c S system_server
radio     110   36  116660 19096 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S com.android.phone
app_0     113   36  121760 24304 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S android.process.acore
app_8     137   36  104148 16936 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S com.android.mms
app_4     153   36  101068 17824 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S com.android.calendar
app_7     162   36   96408 16420 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S com.android.alarmclock
app_0     170   36   99576 16748 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S com.android.inputmethod.latin
app_3     186   36   98540 17148 ffffffff afe0d4e4 S android.process.media
```




```
  6:   1  +- app_process (36) <kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
  7:   1     +- app_process (65) <kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
  8:   1     +- app_process (110) <kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
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 13:   1     +- app_process (170) <kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
 14:   1     +- app_process (186) <kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
```

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```

- ...they are all fork()ed from app_process!

```
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```



Problem with splitting domains

- New and unexpected situation for TOMOYO Linux
- In TOMOYO Linux, **domain transitions occur after** process invocation, that is **execve(), not fork()**

→Splitting domain

<kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process

in different domains according to each single application is impossible. . . ?



Problem with splitting domains


```
File  Edit  View  Terminal  Tabs  Help
<<< Domain Transition Editor >>>      22 domains    '?' for help

<kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
    0:  1     <kernel>
    1:  1         /init
    2:  1             /sbin/adbd
    3:  1             /sbin/ccs-editpolicy-agent
    4:  1             /system/bin/app_process
    5:  1             /system/bin/bootanimation
    6:  1             /system/bin/dbus-daemon
    7:  1             /system/bin/debuggerd
    8:  1             /system/bin/installd
    9:  1             /system/bin/keystore
   10:  1             /system/bin/logcat
   11:  1             /system/bin/mediaserver
   12:  1             /system/bin/qemud
   13:  1             /system/bin/rild
   14:  1             /system/bin/servicemanager
   15:  1             /system/bin/sh
   16:  1             /system/bin/vold
   17:  1             /system/etc/init.goldfish.sh
   18:  1                 /system/bin/getprop
   19:  1                 /system/bin/ifconfig
   20:  1                 /system/bin/qemu-props
   21:  1                 /system/bin/route
```

<kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process

TOMOYO's MAC and Android DAC

- Android security rule: data files of one application should be prevented from being accessed by other applications
- This is performed by using DAC permissions, as said before
- TOMOYO can provide with conditional ACL a further insurance that this rule is respected, especially in cases when:
  - DAC permissions are poorly configured
  - root process (zygote) would be hijacked

```
allow_read/write   @APP_DATA_FILE    if   task.uid=path1.uid
allow_unlink       @APP_DATA_FILE    if   task.uid=path1.uid
allow_mkdir        @APP_DATA_DIR     if   task.uid=path1.parent.uid1
```

TOMOYO's MAC and Android DAC

- DAC's ability to restrict by UID has a low granularity: only "owner", "group", "others".
- TOMOYO, on the other hand, allows minimal and customizable permissions to any group of specific UIDs.
- Example: users are app_1, app_2, app_3, app_4; some files owned by app_2 (uid=10002) need to be accessed by app_1 (uid=10001) also, but not by all the "others".

```
allow_read/write    @SOME_FILES    if   task.uid=10001-10002
```

An example

We want to allow only the Browser to connect to Internet.



In this way **any** process running under
"<kernel> /init /system/app/process"

domain would be allowed to open TCP connection on any IP, port 80.

→ *least-privilege principle violated*

Solution

- TOMOYO Linux allows conditional ACL
- **Using task's UID as a condition**, for access grant.

```
File  Edit  View  Terminal  Tabs  Help
<<< Domain Policy Editor >>>      201 entries    '?' for help

<kernel> /init /system/bin/app_process
  186: allow_capability SYS_TIME
  187: allow_capability SYS_UNLINK
  188: allow_network    TCP bind 0.0.0.0 0
  189: allow_network    TCP connect 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255 80 if task.uid=@HTTP_USERS
  190: allow_network    TCP connect 74.125.153.113 443
  191: allow_network    UDP bind 0.0.0.0 30372
```

In this way only the process with UID in HTTP_USERS group will be able to connect

Solution

- **Add UID of browser application to HTTP_USERS group**



In this way **only** browser will be able to connect

DEMO: Make policy for Web browser

- Web browser access to restrict the location



Saving access logs

- You can save access logs by starting ccs-auditd (host computer) as shown below.

```
/usr/sbin/ccs-auditd    /tmp/grant_log   /tmp/reject_log    127.0.0.1:10000
```

```
#2009-10-19 10:07:15# profile=1 mode=learning (global-pid=36) task={ pid=36 ppid=1 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 egid=0
suid=0 sgid=0 fsuid=0 fsgid=0 state[0]=0 state[1]=0 state[2]=0 type!=execute_handler } path1={ uid=0 gid=2000 in
o=537 major=31 minor=0 perm=0755 type=file } path1.parent={ uid=0 gid=2000 ino=468 perm=0755 } exec={ real
path="/system/bin/app_process" argc=5 envc=10 argv[]={ "/system/bin/app_process" "-Xzygote" "/system/bin" "--z
ygote" "--start-system-server" } envp[]={ "PATH=/sbin:/system/sbin:/system/bin:/system/xbin" "LD_LIBRARY_PAT
H=/system/lib" "ANDROID_BOOTLOGO=1" "ANDROID_ROOT=/system" "ANDROID_ASSETS=/system/app" "A
NDROID_DATA=/data" "EXTERNAL_STORAGE=/sdcard" "BOOTCLASSPATH=/system/framework/core.jar:/syst
em/framework/ext.jar:/system/framework/framework.jar:/system/framework/android.policy.jar:/system/framework/s
ervices.jar" "ANDROID_PROPERTY_WORKSPACE=9,32768" "ANDROID_SOCKET_zygote=10" } }
<kernel> /init
allow_execute /system/bin/app_process
```

- You can create advanced policy settings from access logs.

Policy error handler

- Similar to “page fault handler”



Conclusions

- TOMOYO Linux suits well on Android
  - Will suits on other embedded devices as well
- MAC enforced for system services and user applications
  - Whole system or targeted applications
- *Why not to try TOMOYO?*

Thank you for your attention

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Giuseppe La Tona <giuseppelatona@gmail.com>

Information

- Mailing list
  - English: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp
  - Japanese: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp
- Web site
  - http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
- Wiki
  - http://elinux.org/TomoyoLinux

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